Causal powers

Nancy Cartwright offers an account of causal powers, and argues that it explains some important general features of scientific method. Patricia Cheng argues that this theory is superior as a psychological theory of learning to standard models of conditioning. I extend and develop the theory, and argue that it provides the best explanation of a number of problem cases for philosophical theories of causation, including preemption, overdetermination and puzzles about transitivity. Hitchcock and Halpern & Pearl on ‘actual causes’ Problems and morals 2.1 Puzzles about prevention 2.2 Counterfactuals Causal powers 3.1 Generative causal power 3.2 Preventative causal power Net and component powers ‘Actual’ or ‘successful’ causes Solutions to puzzle cases Conclusion.
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DOI 10.1093/phisci/axi102
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Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock (2015). Graded Causation and Defaults. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.
Franz Huber (2013). Structural Equations and Beyond. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):709-732.

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