David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415 (2011)
This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties
|Keywords||Reduction Functionalism Mental property Second-order property Functional property Metaphysics|
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References found in this work BETA
Ross P. Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Ontological Commitment: Or How to Deal with Complex Objects and Mathematical Ontology Without Getting Into Trouble. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):1 - 18.
John Heil (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford University Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1992). Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Raphael Riel (2012). Pains, Pills and Properties – Functionalism and the First‐Order/Second‐Order Distinction. Dialectica 66 (4):543-562.
Eric Hiddleston (2011). Reductionism and the Micro-Macro Mirroring Thesis. Synthese 181 (2):209 - 226.
Raphael van Riel (2012). Pains, Pills and Properties - Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction. Dialectica 66 (4):543-562.
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