Second-order properties and three varieties of functionalism

Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415 (2011)
Abstract
This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties
Keywords Reduction  Functionalism  Mental property  Second-order property  Functional property  Metaphysics
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jaegwon Kim (1992). Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.

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