Rational capacity as a condition on blame

Philosophical Books 48 (2):109–123 (2007)
In "Rational Capacities" Michael Smith outlines the sense of capacity he believes to be required before blame is appropriate. I question whether this sense of capacity is required. In so doing, I consider different ways in which blame might be conditioned.
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PhilPapers Archive Pamela Hieronymi, Rational capacity as a condition on blame
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Miranda Fricker (2010). The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):151-177.
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