Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Books 48 (2):109–123 (2007)
|Abstract||In "Rational Capacities" Michael Smith outlines the sense of capacity he believes to be required before blame is appropriate. I question whether this sense of capacity is required. In so doing, I consider different ways in which blame might be conditioned.|
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