The reasons of trust

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236 (2008)
I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400801886496
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):267-97.

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