David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236 (2008)
I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response.
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References found in this work BETA
Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
J. David Velleman (1996). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
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Citations of this work BETA
Katherine Hawley (2014). Trust, Distrust and Commitment. Noûs 48 (1):1-20.
Zac Cogley (2012). Trust and the Trickster Problem. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):30-47.
Karen Frost-Arnold (2014). The Cognitive Attitude of Rational Trust. Synthese (9):1-18.
Paul Faulkner (2015). The Attitude of Trust is Basic. Analysis 75 (3):424-429.
Arnon Keren (2014). Trust and Belief: A Preemptive Reasons Account. Synthese 191 (12):2593-2615.
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