An Adamsian Theory of Intrinsic Value

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):273-289 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper I develop a theological account of intrinsic value drawn from some passages in Robert Merrihew Adams’ book Finite and Infinite Goods. First I explain why Adams’ work on this topic is interesting, situate his theory within the broader literature on intrinsic value, and draw attention to some of its revisionist features. Next I state the theory, raise some problems for it, and refine it in light of those problems. Then I illustrate how the refined theory works by showing that it has the resources to deal with some seemingly formidable objections
Keywords Adams, R.M.  Instrinsic value  God
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    Ben Bradley (2002). Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.

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    Ralph Wedgwood (2009). Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.. 342-363.
    Julie Tannenbaum (2010). Categorizing Goods. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol 5. Oxford University Press.
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