Basic sensible qualities and the structure of appearance

Philosophical Issues 18 (1):385-405 (2008)
A sensible quality is a perceptible property, a property that physical objects (or events) perceptually appear to have. Thus smells, tastes, colors and shapes are sensible qualities. An egg, for example, may smell rotten, taste sour, and look cream and round.1,2 The sensible qualities are not a miscellanous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, magenta, and chartreuse are not merely three different shades of color: the first two are more similar than either is to the third. Familiar color spaces or color solids capture, to a greater or lesser extent, these relations between the colors. The same goes for sensible qualities perceived in other modalities: middle C, high C, and D are not merely three different notes, and the taste of lemons, oranges, and sugar cubes are not merely three different tastes. How can this structure of appearance be explained? One idea is that sensible qualities are of two sorts: basic and derived. The basic sensible qualities are the building blocks from which the derived sensible qualities can be..
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References found in this work BETA
Vere Chappell (2004). Symposium: Locke and the Veil of Perception Preface. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):243–244.

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Citations of this work BETA
Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Experiencing Speech. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):305-332.
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