David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 18 (1):385-405 (2008)
A sensible quality is a perceptible property, a property that physical objects (or events) perceptually appear to have. Thus smells, tastes, colors and shapes are sensible qualities. An egg, for example, may smell rotten, taste sour, and look cream and round.1,2 The sensible qualities are not a miscellanous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, magenta, and chartreuse are not merely three different shades of color: the first two are more similar than either is to the third. Familiar color spaces or color solids capture, to a greater or lesser extent, these relations between the colors. The same goes for sensible qualities perceived in other modalities: middle C, high C, and D are not merely three different notes, and the taste of lemons, oranges, and sugar cubes are not merely three different tastes. How can this structure of appearance be explained? One idea is that sensible qualities are of two sorts: basic and derived. The basic sensible qualities are the building blocks from which the derived sensible qualities can be..
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References found in this work BETA
Jeffrey C. King (2007). The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford University Press.
Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2003). Color Realism and Color Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Mark Johnston (2007). Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233–268.
Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Citations of this work BETA
Will Davies (2014). The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.
Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Experiencing Speech. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):305-332.
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