Comment on J. A. Fodor's ``Cognitive science and the twin-Earth problem''
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (3):294-295 (1982)
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Jerry A. Fodor (1982). Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (April):98-118.
Tyler Burge (1982). Two Thought Experiments Reviewed: Comments on J. A. Fodor's Paper: ``Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem''. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (3):284-293.
Katalin Farkas (2003). Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.
Lawrence Pasternack (2001). Internal Realism and Twin Earth. Idealistic Studies 31 (1):73-80.
Kam-Yuen Cheng (2002). Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live Without Them? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
Ron McClamrock (1991). Methodological Individualism Considered as a Constitutive Principle of Scientific Inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):343-54.
Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Stoljar's Twin-Physics World. Philosophia 41 (1):127-136.
Hilary Putnam (1975). The Meaning of 'Meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Susan Schneider (2007). Yes, It Does: A Diatribe on Jerry Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Psyche.
Michael Rubin (2008). Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307 - 327.
Michael McGlone (forthcoming). Putnam on What Isn't in the Head. Philosophical Studies.
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