Topoi 7 (March):11-24 (1988)
|Abstract||My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs|
|Keywords||Awareness Introspection Metaphysics Philosophical Psychology Sensation|
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