Online research in philosophy

In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – and noncognitivism. Phenomenological arguments have been used in support of the first two positions, but my general claim is that ethical phenomenology supports no metaethical position over any other.I discuss two types of phenomenological argument that might be offered in support of different types of moral realism, although I couch my debate in terms of IMR. The first argument asserts that ethical properties are not experienced in the way that rivals to IMR say we experience them. Against this I claim that it is odd to think that one could experience ethical properties as any metaethical theory characterizes them. The second argument is more complicated: the general thought is that an adequate metaethical theory should not distort our ethical experience unduly. I consider one aspect of our ethical experience – that there is some ethical authority to which our judgements answer – in order to illustrate this idea. I discuss why IMRealists might think that this phenomenon supports their position. Against them I claim that other metaethical positions might be able to accommodate the phenomenon of ethical authority. Even if they cannot, then, secondly, I argue that there are other aspects of our ethical experience that sit more naturally with other metaethical positions. Hence, one cannot argue that ethical phenomenology as a whole supports one theory over any others.

This paper provides examples of how a teacher and a principal construct their ‘ethical selves’. In doing so we demonstrate how Foucault's four-part ethical framework can be a scaffold with which to actively connect emotions to a personal ethical position. We argue that ethical work is and should be an ongoing and dynamic life long process rather than a more rigid adherence to a ‘code of ethics’ that may not meaningfully engage its adherents. We use Foucault's four-part framework of ethical practice as a framework through which an ‘ethical self’ can be purposely constructed. This is important work, as those who have authority over others must know how to monitor themselves against the misuse of the power of their positions.

There appears to be an implicit assumption by those connected with the ethical investment movement (e.g., ethical investment firms, individual investors, social investment organizations, academia, and the media), that ethical investment is in fact ethical. This paper will attempt to challenge the notion that the ethical mutual fund industry, as currently taking place, is acting in an ethical manner. Ethical issues such as the transparency of the funds and advertising are discussed. Ethical mutual fund screens such as tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and the military are preliminarily examined to better determine whether they can actually be defined as "ethical" screens as opposed to merely social, political, or religious screens. A code of ethics for ethical investment is constructed by which ethical mutual fund firms can be audited for ethical compliance.

This paper provides examples of how a teacher and a principal construct their 'ethical selves'. In doing so we demonstrate how Foucault's four-part ethical framework can be a scaffold with which to actively connect emotions to a personal ethical position. We argue that ethical work is and should be an ongoing and dynamic life long process rather than a more rigid adherence to a 'code of ethics' that may not meaningfully engage its adherents. We use Foucault's four-part framework of ethical practice as a framework through which an 'ethical self' can be purposely constructed. This is important work, as those who have authority over others must know how to monitor themselves against the misuse of the power of their positions.

In this paper I examine the claim that businesspersons have what might be called "ethical immunity" with respect to the duty not to deceive. According to this ethical immunity claim, businesspersons are exempt from the ordinary ethical prohibition against deception; and widespread business deception is therefore ethically permissible. I focus on two arguments for the claim. One of the arguments, which has been presented by Albert Carr, relies upon an analogy between business on the one hand, and games in which deception is permitted, on the other. The second argument is based upon the notion that exceptions to ethical duties may sometimes be justified on prudential grounds. In response to the arguments, I try to show that neither one provides strong support for the ethical immunity claim.

The current study examines informal, practitioner-directed ethical discourses within the Canadian CA profession for the 1912–1997 period. Starting from the premise that ethical discourse within practitioner journals are less constrained, more flexible and timely than formal ethical codes in communicating "important" ethical information to the lay membership, we examine: (1) is the CA profession''s current interest in ethics a recent phenomena?, (2) what was meant by the term ethics in earlier periods?, and (3) are current-day ethical discourses a continuation of – or break with – prior discourses? We expect that the analysis provides a necessary historical context for understanding the state of current-day ethical discussions with public accountancy.

In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different answers.

The 'No Ought From Is' principle faces a dilemma. If 'mixed' sentences, i.e. those containing both ethical and non-ethical predicates, are included as 'oughts', then the principle is false. But if mixed sentences are excluded, then the principle is irrelevant to ethics, because ethical arguments typically involve mixed sentences. This paper proposes a solution to the dilemma: a sentence is to be counted as an 'ought' just in case it has ethical ontological commitments. This interpretation of No Ought From Is is shown to be both true and relevant.

Hume's Law states that a valid argument cannot have an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Prior proposes the following counterexample: `Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot.' One strategy for responding to Prior is to restrict Hume's Law to arguments that contain no `mixed sentences', i.e., sentences like the disjunctive conclusion in Prior's example. Here I examine this strategy in the context of first-order logic. I consider five interpretations of Hume’s Law, three of which I show to be true.

Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. I argue that this fact illuminates the epistemology of ethical intuitions.