Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
- David R. Hiley (1978). Is Eliminative Materialism Materialistic? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):325-37.
Similar books and articles
An expanded and updated edition of this classic collection.
The aim of this essay is to explore the potential for an epistemology consistent with eliminative materialism based on work in connectionist modeling.
The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations.
Richard Rorty's eliminative materialism is an attack on dualism that has frequently been misrepresented and incorrectly criticized. By taking account of the mistakes that philosophers have made concerning eliminative materialism, a proper definition of the doctrine and a clarification of its relation to traditional materialism will emerge, as well as an understanding of its true strengths and weaknesses. The discussion centers around the original manner in which Rorty defended eliminative materialism by means of analogies to the elimination of talk about demons and talk about macroscopic physical objects.
Discussion of David R. Hiley, Is eliminative materialism materialistic?
|
|
There are no threads in this forum |
Nothing in this forum yet.

