David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 47 (1):1 – 19 (2004)
Sidgwick argued that utilitarianism was not rationally required because it could not be shown that a utilitarian theory of practical reason was better justified than a rival egoist theory of practical reason: there is a 'dualism of practical reason' between utilitarianism and egoism. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the dualism argument also applies to Kant's moral theory, the moral law. A prudential theory that is parallel to the moral law is devised, and it is argued that the moral law is no better justified than this prudential theory. So the moral law is not rationally required. It is suggested that the dualism argument is a completely general argument that ethics cannot be rationally required.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alison Hills (2008). Kantian Value Realism. Ratio 21 (2):182–200.
Alison Hills (2005). Rational Nature as the Source of Value. Kantian Review 10 (1):60-81.
Alison Hills (2007). The Principle of Right: Practical Reason and Justification in Kant's Ethical and Political Philosophy. Politics and Ethics Review 3 (1):24-36.
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