Intentions, foreseen consequences and the doctrine of double effect

Philosophical Studies 133 (2):257 - 283 (2007)
The difficulty of distinguishing between the intended and the merely foreseen consequences of actions seems to many to be the most serious problem for the doctrine of double effect. It has led some to reject the doctrine altogether, and has left some of its defenders recasting it in entirely different terms. I argue that these responses are unnecessary. Using Bratman’s conception of intention, I distinguish the intended consequences of an action from the merely foreseen in a way that can be used to support the doctrine of double effect.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/25471899
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Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2013). Three Cheers for Double Effect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):125-158.

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