Intentions, foreseen consequences and the doctrine of double effect

Philosophical Studies 133 (2):257 - 283 (2007)
Abstract
The difficulty of distinguishing between the intended and the merely foreseen consequences of actions seems to many to be the most serious problem for the doctrine of double effect. It has led some to reject the doctrine altogether, and has left some of its defenders recasting it in entirely different terms. I argue that these responses are unnecessary. Using Bratman’s conception of intention, I distinguish the intended consequences of an action from the merely foreseen in a way that can be used to support the doctrine of double effect.
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References found in this work BETA
Philippa Foot (1997). Virtues and Vices. In Daniel Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics. Georgetown University Press. 163--177.

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Citations of this work BETA
Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2013). Three Cheers for Double Effect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):125-158.
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