David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 133 (2):257 - 283 (2007)
The difficulty of distinguishing between the intended and the merely foreseen consequences of actions seems to many to be the most serious problem for the doctrine of double effect. It has led some to reject the doctrine altogether, and has left some of its defenders recasting it in entirely different terms. I argue that these responses are unnecessary. Using Bratman’s conception of intention, I distinguish the intended consequences of an action from the merely foreseen in a way that can be used to support the doctrine of double effect.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Religion Philosophy of Mind Epistemology Logic Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
William J. FitzPatrick (2012). The Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):183-196.
Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2015). So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short. Noûs 49 (2):376-409.
Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2014). Three Cheers for Double Effect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):125-158.
Simon Fitzpatrick (2014). Distinguishing Between Three Versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect Hypothesis in Moral Psychology. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):505-525.
S. Matthew Liao (forthcoming). The Closeness Problem and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Way Forward. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-15.
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