David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 128 (1):109 - 135 (2006)
Nelson Goodman cast the ‘problem of induction’ as the task of articulating the principles and standards by which to distinguish valid from invalid inductive inferences. This paper explores some logical bounds on the ability of a rational reasoner to accomplish this task. By a simple argument, either an inductive inference method cannot admit its own fallibility, or there exists some non-inferable hypothesis whose non-inferability the method cannot infer (violating the principle of ‘negative introspection’). The paper discusses some implications of this limited self-knowledge for the justifiability of inductive inferences, auto-epistemic logic, and the epistemic foundations of game theory.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Gilbert H. Harman (1968). Enumerative Induction as Inference to the Best Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 65 (18):529-533.
Gilbert H. Harman (1965). The Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.
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