David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio 21 (2):182–200 (2008)
Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. They argue that Kant has an account of the relationship between practical reason and value, known as "Kantian constructivism" that is far superior to the traditional "value realist" theory, and that it is because of this that we should accept his theory.1 It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant's moral theory stands or falls with Kantian constructivism.2 But this is a mistake. In this paper, I sketch a rival Kantian theory of value, which I call Kantian value realism. I argue that there is textual evidence that Kant himself accepted value realism rather than constructivism. Whilst my aim in this paper is to set out the theory clearly rather than to defend it, I will try to show that Kantian value realism is preferable to Kantian constructivism and that it is worthy of further study.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.) (1997). Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
William J. FitzPatrick (2005). The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard's Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity. Ethics 115 (4):651-691.
Paul Guyer (2000). Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge University Press.
Paul Guyer (1998). The Value of Reason and the Value of Freedom. Ethics 109 (1):22-35.
Paul Guyer (1996). The Value of Agency:The Practice of Moral Judgment. Barbara Herman. Ethics 106 (2):404-.
Citations of this work BETA
T. H. Irwin (2011). Continuity in the History of Autonomy. Inquiry 54 (5):442 - 459.
Anne Margaret Baxley (2012). The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism. Inquiry 55 (6):567-583.
Similar books and articles
Emer O'Hagan (2009). Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525-537.
Christina Lafont (2004). Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian Constructivism? Ratio Juris 17 (1):27-51.
Carla Bagnoli (2001). Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):307-329.
Friedel Weinert (2005). Einstein and Kant. Philosophy 80 (4):585-593.
Nader Shoaibi (2010). In Defense of Kantian Moral Theory. California Undergraduate Philosophy Review 3 (1).
Thomas M. Besch (2011). Kantian Constructivism, the Issue of Scope, and Perfectionism: O'Neill on Ethical Standing. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):1-20.
Jacquie L'Etang (1992). A Kantian Approach to Codes of Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 11 (10):737 - 744.
Thomas M. Besch (2008). Constructing Practical Reason: O'Neill on the Grounds of Kantian Constructivism. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1):55-76.
Lara Denis (1999). Kant on the Perfection of Others. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):25-41.
Richard Galvin (2011). Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Varieties of Kantian Constructivism in Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):16-36.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads126 ( #8,247 of 1,101,947 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #24,823 of 1,101,947 )
How can I increase my downloads?