On Truth-Functionality

Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):628-632 (2010)
Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is immune from the counterexamples that Schnieder proposes and is preferable to Schnieder’s alternative.
Keywords truth-functionality  logical operators  Schnieder, Benjamin  truth tables  dependency
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DOI 10.1017/S1755020310000274
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1982). Methods of Logic. Harvard University Press.
Benjamin Schnieder (2008). Truth-Functionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):64-72.

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