David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Kantian Review 10 (1):60-81 (2005)
The most prominent recent interpretations of Kantian ethics place rational nature at the centre of the theory: I must respect rational nature, whether in myself or in others, because rational nature has a special status as the source of all other values. It is not obvious what it is for something to be the source of value, nor whether rational nature could play this role, but until these issues are settled the coherence of Kantian ethics is in question. In this article I offer an explanation of what it is for rational nature to be the source of value, I show that this claim is an important element of Kant's moral theory, and I defend this conception of value
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