Rational nature as the source of value

Kantian Review 10 (1):60-81 (2005)
The most prominent recent interpretations of Kantian ethics place rational nature at the centre of the theory: I must respect rational nature, whether in myself or in others, because rational nature has a special status as the source of all other values. It is not obvious what it is for something to be the source of value, nor whether rational nature could play this role, but until these issues are settled the coherence of Kantian ethics is in question. In this article I offer an explanation of what it is for rational nature to be the source of value, I show that this claim is an important element of Kant's moral theory, and I defend this conception of value.
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DOI 10.1017/S1369415400002132
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
J. Rawls (1995). Political Liberalism. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Immanuel Kant (2007). Lectures on Ethics. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), International Journal of Ethics. Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 104-106.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Nyholm (2013). On Kant's Idea of Humanity as an End in Itself. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):358-374.

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