Safety and epistemic luck

Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313 (2007)
Abstract
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
Keywords Knowledge  Epistemic luck  Safety  Duncan Pritchard  Gettier
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References found in this work BETA
Juan Comesaña (2005). Unsafe Knowledge. Synthese 146 (3):395 - 404.
Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.
Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.

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