Safety and epistemic luck

Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313 (2007)
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
Keywords Knowledge  Epistemic luck  Safety  Duncan Pritchard  Gettier
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DOI 10.2307/27653597
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References found in this work BETA
Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.

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