David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 55 (2):165 - 173 (1983)
This paper discusses the skeptical argument presented by Keith Lehrer in his paper Why Not Scepticism?. It is argued that Lehrer's argument depends on unacceptable premises, and therefore fails to establish the skeptical conclusion. On the other hand, it is also shown that even if the skeptic's opponent (called a dogmatist) knows something, he may be unable to prove this in a way which could convince the skeptic; hence the difficulty of refuting skepticism. The paper also criticises Dretske's attempt to refute skeptical arguments by rejecting the consequence condition for epistemic justification.
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