David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Logica 89 (1):81 - 109 (2008)
It is well-known that classical models of belief are not realistic representations of human doxastic capacity; equally, models of actions involving beliefs, such as decisions based on beliefs, or changes of beliefs, suffer from a similar inaccuracies. In this paper, a general framework is presented which permits a more realistic modelling both of instantaneous states of belief, and of the operations involving them. This framework is motivated by some of the inadequacies of existing models, which it overcomes, whilst retaining technical rigour in so far as it relies on known, natural logical and mathematical notions. The companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part II) contains an application of this framework to the particular case of belief revision.
|Keywords||Philosophy Computational Linguistics Mathematical Logic and Foundations Logic|
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Citations of this work BETA
Brian Hill (2010). Awareness Dynamics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):113 - 137.
Hans Rott (2011). Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference. Topoi 30 (1):59-69.
Brian Hill (2013). Awareness and Equilibrium. Synthese 190 (5):851-869.
Brian Hill (2009). Living Without State-Independence of Utilities. Theory and Decision 67 (4):405-432.
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