Graduate studies at Western
Cambridge University Press (2002)
|Abstract||There is an important family of semantic notions that are applied to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts--as when one says that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Christopher Hill presents a theory of the content of such notions. That theory is largely deflationary in spirit. It represents a broad range of semantic notions free from substantive metaphysical and empirical presuppositions. He also explains the relationship of mirroring or semantic correspondence linking thoughts to reality.|
|Keywords||Truth Proposition (Logic Semantics (Philosophy|
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|Call number||BC181.H55 2002|
|ISBN(s)||0521892430 0521814847 9780521892438|
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