The identity theory
| Abstract | Identity theory The doctrine that mental states are identical with physical states was defended in antiquity by Lucretius and in the early modern era by Hobbes. It achieved considerable prominence in the 1950s as a result of the writings of Herbert Feigl, U. T. Place, and J. J. C. Smart. (See, e.g., Smart (1959). These authors developed reasonably precise formulations of the doctrine, clarified the grounds for embracing it, and responded persuasively to a range of objections. More recently it has been defended systematically by Hill (1991) and Papineau (2002). Other contemporary advocates include Loar (1990), McLaughlin (2004), and Polger (2005). The doctrine also figures explicitly or implicitly in the writings of dualists, who are of course concerned to oppose it. Thus, for example, it plays an important role in Kripke’s influential defense of dualism (Kripke 1980). | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesEvelyn Begley Pluhar (1977). Physicalism and the Identity Theory. Journal of Critical Analysis 7 (1):11-20.
Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press.
Norman Malcolm (1964). Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory. Dialogue 3 (02):115-25.
Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) (2012). New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press.
C. P. Presley (ed.) (1967). The Identity Theory of Mind. University of Queensland Press.
J. J. C. Smart (1972). Further Thoughts on the Identity Theory. The Monist 56 (April):177-92.
Clive Vernon Borst (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..
Thomas W. Polger (2011). Are Sensations Still Brain Processes? Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
Don Merrell (2011). Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
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