Value, reason and hedonism

Utilitas 20 (1):50-58 (2008)
It is widely believed that we always have reason to maximize the good. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories depend on this conception of value. Scanlon has argued that this view of value is not generally correct, but that it is most plausible with regard to the value of pleasure, and may even be true at least of that. But there are reasons to think that even the value of pleasure is not teleological
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820807002890
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