Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria for moral agency: What properties must an artificial agent have to be a moral agent? [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):19-29 (2009)
In this essay, I describe and explain the standard accounts of agency, natural agency, artificial agency, and moral agency, as well as articulate what are widely taken to be the criteria for moral agency, supporting the contention that this is the standard account with citations from such widely used and respected professional resources as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I then flesh out the implications of some of these well-settled theories with respect to the prerequisites that an ICT must satisfy in order to count as a moral agent accountable for its behavior. I argue that each of the various elements of the necessary conditions for moral agency presupposes consciousness, i.e., the capacity for inner subjective experience like that of pain or, as Nagel puts it, the possession of an internal something-of-which-it is-is-to-be-like. I ultimately conclude that the issue of whether artificial moral agency is possible depends on the issue of whether it is possible for ICTs to be conscious.
|Keywords||accountability agency artificial agents consciousness ethics moral agency natural agents|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ugo Pagallo (2011). Robots of Just War: A Legal Perspective. Philosophy and Technology 24 (3):307-323.
Bradley J. Strawser (2010). Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles. Journal of Military Ethics 9 (4):342-368.
Herman Tavani (2011). Can We Develop Artificial Agents Capable of Making Good Moral Decisions? Minds and Machines 21 (3):465-474.
Mark Coeckelbergh (2009). Virtual Moral Agency, Virtual Moral Responsibility: On the Moral Significance of the Appearance, Perception, and Performance of Artificial Agents. [REVIEW] AI and Society 24 (2):181-189.
Sadjad Soltanzadeh (forthcoming). Humanist and Nonhumanist Aspects of Technologies as Problem Solving Physical Instruments. Philosophy and Technology:1-18.
Similar books and articles
Lynne Tirrell (1990). Storytelling and Moral Agency. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (2):115-126.
Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto (2009). Consumer Ethics in Japan: An Economic Reconstruction of Moral Agency of Japanese Firms – Qualitative Insights From Grocery/Retail Markets. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 84 (1):29 - 44.
Shaun Gallagher (2007). Moral Agency, Self-Consciousness, and Practical Wisdom. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):199-223.
Steve Matthews (2004). Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424.
Paul Shapiro (2006). Moral Agency in Other Animals. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):357-373.
S. Grodzinsky Frances, W. Miller Keith & J. Wolf Marty (forthcoming). The Ethics of Designing Artificial Agents. Ethics and Information Technology.
Frances S. Grodzinsky, Keith W. Miller & Marty J. Wolf (2008). The Ethics of Designing Artificial Agents. Ethics and Information Technology 10 (2-3):115-121.
Robert Boostrom (1998). The Student as Moral Agent. Journal of Moral Education 27 (2):179-190.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads77 ( #18,017 of 1,102,965 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #21,031 of 1,102,965 )
How can I increase my downloads?