David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Religious Studies 46 (1):21-39 (2010)
According to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that Plantinga's version of the FWA succeeds as a theodicy. In particular, I argue that, given this understanding of Christian ethics, it seems reasonable to think it false that free beings are doing more good than evil in the world. While there are surely possible worlds in which free beings do more good than evil, this material world seems clearly not one of those. Thus, while Plantinga's version might succeed as a defence against the logical problem of evil, it will neither rebut the evidential problem of evil nor, without more, ground a successful theodicy that reconciles God's existence with the evil that occurs in this world
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz'Lapse. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (1):137-146.
Wesley Morriston (1985). Is God “Significantly Free?”. Faith and Philosophy 2 (3):257-264.
A. M. Weisberger (1995). Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 31 (3):375-390.
Wes Morriston (2000). What is so Good About Moral Freedom? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):344-358.
Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne (1998). Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):1-21.
Kenneth Einar Himma (2009). The Free-Will Defence: Evil and the Moral Value of Free Will. Religious Studies 45 (4):395-415.
Camille Atkinson (2007). Kant on Human Nature and Radical Evil. Philosophy and Theology 19 (1/2):215-224.
James F. Sennett (1999). Is There Freedom In Heaven? Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):69-82.
David Basinger (1982). Anderson on Plantinga. Philosophy Research Archives 8:315-320.
Added to index2010-01-21
Total downloads83 ( #23,587 of 1,696,654 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #64,116 of 1,696,654 )
How can I increase my downloads?