David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Religious Studies 45 (4):395-415 (2009)
One version of the free-will argument relies on the claim that, other things being equal, a world in which free beings exist is morally preferable to a world in which free beings do not exist (the 'value thesis'). I argue that this version of the free-will argument cannot support a theodicy that should alleviate the doubts about God's existence to which the problems of evil give rise. In particular, I argue that the value thesis has no foundation in common intuitions about morality. Without some sort of intuitive support, the value thesis lacks the resources to serve as the foundation for a theodicy that addresses the powerful intuition, which affects believers and non-believers alike, that a perfect God would not allow so much evil
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
A. M. Weisberger (1995). Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 31 (3):375-390.
Frank J. Murphy (1995). The Problem of Evil and a Plausible Defence. Religious Studies 31 (2):243-250.
Andrew Eshleman (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 33 (3):267-286.
Alexander Pruss (2003). A New Free-Will Defence. Religious Studies 39 (2):211-223.
Michael J. Almeida (2004). Ideal Worlds and the Transworld Untrustworthy. Religious Studies 40 (1):113-123.
Kenneth Einar Himma (2010). Plantinga's Version of the Free-Will Argument: The Good and Evil That Free Beings Do. Religious Studies 46 (1):21-39.
Wes Morriston (2003). Are Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection Compatible? Reply to Mawson. Religious Studies 39 (4):441-449.
Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Moral Evil and Human Freedom: A Reply to Tierno. Sophia 42 (2):107-111.
James Cain (2004). Free Will and the Problem of Evil. Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456.
T. J. Mawson (2004). The Possibility of a Free-Will Defence for the Problem of Natural Evil. Religious Studies 40 (1):23-42.
Added to index2009-10-25
Total downloads86 ( #50,786 of 1,911,919 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #182,520 of 1,911,919 )
How can I increase my downloads?