Graduate studies at Western
Ethics and Information Technology 6 (3):145-159 (2004)
|Abstract||. Luciano Floridi argues that every existing entity is deserving of at least minimal moral respect in virtue of having intrinsic value qua information object. In this essay, I attempt a comprehensive assessment of this important view as well as the arguments Floridi offers in support of it. I conclude both that the arguments are insufficient and that the thesis itself is substantively implausible from the standpoint of ordinary intuitions.|
|Keywords||ethics foundations of information information objects intrinsic value moral standing|
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