A modest solution to the problem of rule-following

Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98 (2004)
A modest solution to the problem(s) of rule-following is defended against Kripkensteinian scepticism about meaning. Even though parts of it generalise to other concepts, the theory as a whole applies to response-dependent concepts only. It is argued that the finiteness problem is not nearly as pressing for such concepts as it may be for some other kinds of concepts. Furthermore, the modest theory uses a notion of justification as sensitivity to countervailing conditions in order to solve the justification problem. Finally, in order to solve the normativity problem, it relies on substantial specifications of normal conditions such as those that have been proposed by Crispin Wright and Mark Johnston, rather than on Philip Pettit's functionalist specification. This theory is modest in that it does not meet the demands of Kripke's sceptic in full. Arguments are provided as to why this is not needed
Keywords Dependence  Epistemology  Response  Rule  Scepticism  Kripke, S  Pettit, P
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DOI 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000040369.94645.b6
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Masahiro Yamada (2010). Rule Following: A Pedestrian Approach. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):283-311.
Jussi Haukioja (2006). Hindriks on Rule-Following. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):219-239.

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