David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford: Clarendon Press (1973)
Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself: 'How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to what extent do they justify them?' He wants to refer, among other things, to unremarkable experiences, of a sort which he cannot help believing to be so extremely common that it would be ridiculous to call them common experiences. He mainly has in mind sense-experiences, and he thinks of them in a particular way. His way of thinking of them, roughly speaking as something 'inner', is one on which recent logico-linguistic philosophy has thrown a good deal of light. The relevant special notion of an experience contrasts, among other things, with a certain more general biographical notion of an experience, which some dictionaries indicate by the definition, 'an event of which one is the subject'. This book explores the concept of experiences, focusing on the disjunctions between perception and illusion.
|Keywords||Conscious Consciousness Epistemology Event Experience Illusion Perception Subject|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$39.90 used (83% off) $99.45 new (58% off) Amazon page|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
Duncan Pritchard (2011). Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.
Colin McLear (2014). The Kantian (Non)‐Conceptualism Debate. Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.
Miguel Ángel Sebastián (forthcoming). Functions and Mental Representation: The Theoretical Role of Representations and its Real Nature. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
Similar books and articles
Peter Carruthers (1989). Brute Experience. Journal of Philosophy 86 (May):258-269.
Max Velmans (2004). Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
Susan J. Blackmore (2003). Consciousness in Meme Machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):19-30.
P. Joyce (2003). Imagining Experiences Correctly. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):361-370.
Susan J. Blackmore (2002). There is No Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):17-28.
Ram L. P. Vimal (2010). Consciousness, Non-Conscious Experiences and Functions, Proto-Experiences and Proto-Functions, and Subjective Experiences. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):383-389.
A. Minh Nguyen (2001). A Critique of Dretske's Conception of State Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.
Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers (2003). What is the Unity of Consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press
Michael Jacovides (2010). Experiences as Complex Events. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads95 ( #45,014 of 1,911,890 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #324,434 of 1,911,890 )
How can I increase my downloads?