Intuitionistic logic as epistemic logic

Synthese 127 (1-2):7 - 19 (2001)
In the present day and age, it seems that every constructivist philosopher of mathematics and her brother wants to be known as an intuitionist. In this paper, It will be shown that such a self-identification is in most cases mistaken. For one thing, not any old (or new) constructivism is intuitionism because not any old relevant construction is carried out mentally in intuition, as Brouwer envisaged. (edited).
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20117127
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