Person as Lawyer: How Having a Guilty Mind Explains Attributions of Intentional Agency

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):339-340 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In criminal law, foresight betrays a guilty mind as much as intent does: both reveal that the agent is not properly motivated to avoid an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even when unintended. In contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea that acting intentionally is acting with a certain frame of mind.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intentional action and the praise-blame asymmetry.Frank Hindriks - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):630-641.
When a Person Feels that She Is Guilty and Believes that She Is Not Guilty.Juha Räikkä - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:149-152.
Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):293-305.
On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.
The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
Norms and the Knobe Effect.Richard Holton - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):1-8.
The Knobe effect: A brief overview.Adam Feltz - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (3-4):265-277.
Hegel's social theory of agency : the 'inner-outer' problem.Robert Pippin - 2010 - In Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 3-50.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-08

Downloads
120 (#137,881)

6 months
9 (#144,107)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Frank Hindriks
University of Groningen

References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.
Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.
Intentional action and the praise-blame asymmetry.Frank Hindriks - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):630-641.

View all 10 references / Add more references