Graduate studies at Western
Noûs 37 (1):25–51 (2003)
|Abstract||Some philosophers worry that it can never be reasonable to act simply on the basis of trust, yet you act on the basis of self-trust whenever you merely follow through on one of your own intentions. It is no more reasonable to follow through on an intention formed by an untrustworthy earlier self of yours than it is to act on the advice of an untrustworthy interlocutor. But reasonable mistrust equally presupposes untrustworthiness in the mistrusted, or evidence thereof. The concept of an intention, I argue, codifies the fact that practical reason rests on a capacity for reasonable trust.|
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