David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587 (2005)
How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling give reasons directly. They give reasons by inviting the hearer’s trust. This yields a novel form of anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. The status of testimony as a sui generis source of epistemic warrant is entailed by the nature of the act of telling. We can discover the nature of this illocution, and its epistemic role, by examining how it functions in the real world of human relations.
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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Peet (2015). Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What Is Said. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Second-Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.
Pamela Hieronymi (2008). The Reasons of Trust. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.
Joseph Shieber (2012). Against Credibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):1 - 18.
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