Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183 (2008)
|Abstract||Corporate freedom is the freedom of a collective agent to perform a joint action. According to a reductive account, a collective or corporate agent is free exactly if the individuals who constitute the corporate agent are free. It is argued that individual freedoms are neither necessary nor sufficient for corporate freedom. The alternative account proposed here focuses on the performance of the joint action by the corporate agent itself. Subsequently, the analysis is applied to Cohen’s (1983) analysis of proletarian freedom. Cohen claims that proletarians are individually free but collectively unfree to leave the proletariat. I argue that, pace Cohen, such a contrast between individual and collective freedom can only exist if collective freedom is interpreted in terms of corporate freedom|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Adam Przeworski (2003). Freedom to Choose and Democracy. Economics and Philosophy 19 (2):265-279.
Andrew Eshleman (1997). Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 33 (3):267-286.
Mary T. Clark (ed.) (1973). The Problem of Freedom. New York,Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Meghan Griffith (2007). Freedom and Trying: Understanding Agent-Causal Exertions. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.
Kenneth R. Westphal (1993). ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’. In F. C. Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge.
K. Dowding (2011). Republican Freedom, Rights, and the Coalition Problem. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):301-322.
Vere Chappell (1994). Locke on the Freedom of the Will. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #107,306 of 722,681 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,006 of 722,681 )
How can I increase my downloads?