Theory-Ladenness of Observations as a Test Case of Kuhn's Approach to Scientific Inquiry

Abstract
Kuhn's contribution should be viewed as posing a number of important problems, not as a full-fledged theory of the structure of science. Kuhn's alleged theory-ladenness of observations is examined as a test case in the light of Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry. A certain superficial theory-ladenness is built into that model. Moreover, the model provides a deeper analysis of theory-ladenness via the two-levelled character of experimental science. A higher-level and a lower-level inquiry rely on different kinds of initial premises and operate with different kinds of "answers" by nature. The model also throws light on the alleged theory-ladenness of meaning.
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