The semantics of modal notions and the indeterminacy of ontology

Synthese 21 (3-4):408 - 424 (1970)
Abstract
Quantification into modal contexts depends on cross-Identifications of individuals between possible worlds, Which in turn depends on the structure and interrelations of these worlds. There is hence no guarantee that cross-Identification always succeeds. It will fail for the worlds needed for realistic applications of logical modalities, Partly vindicating quine's criticism of them. In general, World lines of individuals cannot always be extended from a world to others
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M. J. Cresswell (1972). The World is Everything That is the Case. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):1 – 13.
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