The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:155-160 (2000)
|Abstract||Pretheoretically, truth is a correspondence between a sentence and facts. Other so-called theories of truth have typically been resorted to because such a correspondence is thought of as being inexpressible or as being incapable of yielding a definition of truth which expresses what we actually mean. It can be shown that truth is indefinable in the paradigm case of ordinary first-order languages only because they cannot express informational independence. As soon as this is corrected, as in independence-friendly first-order logic, truth predicates are readily definable, Tarski notwithstanding. Hence, there is no reason to think that truth cannot also be defined for our actual working language—Tarski’s “colloquial language.”|
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