Self-deception and confabulation

Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429 (2000)
Cases in which people are self-deceived seem to require that the person hold two contradictory beliefs, something which appears to be impossible or implausible. A phenomenon seen in some brain-damaged patients known as confabulation (roughly, an ongoing tendency to make false utterances without intent to deceive) can shed light on the problem of self-deception. The conflict is not actually between two beliefs, but between two representations, a 'conceptual' one and an 'analog' one. In addition, confabulation yields valuable clues about the structure of normal human knowledge-gathering processes. [The hypothesis defended here is significantly altered and greatly expanded in my book Brain Fiction.]
Keywords Belief  Knowledge  Lying  Representation  Science  Self-deception
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DOI 10.1086/392835
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Ian Deweese-Boyd, Self-Deception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Richard Holton (2001). What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):53-69.
Kent Bach (1988). Critical Notice. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press
Annette Barnes (1997). Seeing Through Self-Deception. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Eric Funkhouser (2005). Do the Self-Deceived Get What They Want? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.

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