Online research in philosophy

Let be a finite collection of finite algebras of finite signature such that SP( ) has meet semi-distributive congruence lattices. We prove that there exists a finite collection 1 of finite algebras of the same signature, , such that SP( 1) is finitely axiomatizable.We show also that if , then SP( 1) is finitely axiomatizable. We offer new proofs of two important finite basis theorems of D. Pigozzi and R. Willard. Our actual results are somewhat more general than this abstract indicates.

Von Mises thought that an adequate account of objective probability required a condition of randomness. For frequentists, some such condition is needed to rule out those sequences where the relative frequencies converge towards definite limiting values, and where it is nevertheless not appropriate to speak of probability … [because such a sequence] obeys an easily recognizable law (von Mises, Probability, Statistics, and Truth). But is a condition of randomness required for an adequate account of probability, given the existence of decisive arguments against frequentism? To put it another way: is it characteristic of the probability role that probability should have a connection to randomness? I will answer this question in the negative.

This is the sequel to my “Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism” ( Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts: The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is p iff the limit of the relative frequency of A ’s among the B ’s would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B ’s. I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I consider various frequentist responses, which I argue ultimately fail. I end with a positive proposal of my own, ‘hyper-hypothetical frequentism’, which I argue avoids several of the problems with hypothetical frequentism. It identifies probability with relative frequency in a hyperfinite sequence of trials. However, I argue that this account also fails, and that the prospects for frequentism are dim.

This is the sequel to my "Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism" (Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts: The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is p iff the limit of the relative frequency of A's among the B's would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B's. I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I consider various frequentist responses, which I argue ultimately fail. I end with a positive proposal of my own, 'hyper-hypothetical frequentism', which I argue avoids several of the problems with hypothetical frequentism. It identifies probability with relative frequency in a hyperfinite sequence of trials. However, I argue that this account also fails, and that the prospects for frequentism are dim.

According to finite frequentism, the probability of an attribute A in a finite reference class B is the relative frequency of actual occurrences of A within B. I present fifteen arguments against this position.