“Mises redux” — redux: Fifteen arguments against finite frequentism

Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):209--27 (1996)
According to finite frequentism, the probability of an attribute A in a finite reference class B is the relative frequency of actual occurrences of A within B. I present fifteen arguments against this position.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/20012727
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,822
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Bernard Nickel (2008). Generics and the Ways of Normality. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (6):629-648.
Emily Adlam (2014). The Problem of Confirmation in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 47:21-32.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

90 ( #30,838 of 1,724,747 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #93,245 of 1,724,747 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.