David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 25 (3):299-316 (2010)
In this paper, I examine an account of instrumental reasoning recently put forth by John Broome. His key suggestion is that anyone who engages in reasoning about his intentions also believes that he will do what he intends to do and that combined with a belief about necessary means this creates rational pressure towards believing that one will take the necessary means. I argue that Broomeâs model has three significant problems; his key premise is falseâthe sincere expression of an intention does not entail the belief that one will successfully execute that intention; his account yields a model of instrumental reasoning that is uncomfortably reflective; he seems unable to explain the rational pressure towards taking necessary means that arises directly from having an end and an instrumental belief. All three problems, I argue, are a consequence of Broomeâs inadequate position on what it is to intend to do something
|Keywords||Practical reasoning The instrumental principle Cognitivism John Broome|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
R. M. Hare (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford Clarendon Press.
John Broome (2007). Wide or Narrow Scope? Mind 116 (462):359-370.
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