David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):986-986 (2001)
The theoretical proposal that perceptual experience be thought of as expectancies about sensorimotor contingencies, rather than as expressions of mental representations, is endorsed; examples that effectively enforce that view are discussed; and one example (of perceptual coupling) that seems to demand a mental representation, with all of the diagnostic value such a tool would have, is raised for consideration.
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