Philosophy of Science 48 (3):386-399 (1981)
|Abstract||The paper considers recent proposals by Armstrong, Dretske, and Tooley that revive the view that statements of laws of nature are grounded by the existence of higher order facts relating universals. Several objections to such a view are raised and an alternative analysis, recognizing general facts, is considered. Such an alternative is shown to meet a number of the objections raised against the appeal to higher order facts and it is also related to views of Hume and Wittgenstein. Further objections are then raised to all the non-Humean "realist" attempts to provide special facts to ground the laws of nature.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alexander Bird (2005). The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws. Foundations of Science 10 (4):353-70.
Fred I. Dretske (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
James Woodward (1992). Realism About Laws. Erkenntnis 36 (2):181-218.
Quentin Smith (1996). The Metaphysical Necessity of Natural Laws. Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 18:104-23.
Joan Page`S. (2002). The Dretske–Tooley–Armstrong Theory of Natural Laws and the Inference Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (3):227-243.
Joan Pag (2002). The Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong Theory of Natural Laws and the Inference Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (3):227 – 243.
Chris Swoyer (1982). The Nature of Natural Laws. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):203 – 223.
Alice Drewery (2005). Essentialism and the Necessity of the Laws of Nature. Synthese 144 (3):381-396.
D. H. Mellor (1990). Laws, Chances and Properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):159 – 170.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads70 ( #15,026 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)40 ( #2,348 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?