Natural necessity and laws of nature

Philosophy of Science 48 (3):386-399 (1981)
The paper considers recent proposals by Armstrong, Dretske, and Tooley that revive the view that statements of laws of nature are grounded by the existence of higher order facts relating universals. Several objections to such a view are raised and an alternative analysis, recognizing general facts, is considered. Such an alternative is shown to meet a number of the objections raised against the appeal to higher order facts and it is also related to views of Hume and Wittgenstein. Further objections are then raised to all the non-Humean "realist" attempts to provide special facts to ground the laws of nature.
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DOI 10.1086/289006
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