Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 32 (2):123-136 (1965)
|Abstract||Some philosophers have claimed that one must be acquainted with the elements of one's ontology. Also, believing that substrata and universals are required in an adequate ontology, these philosophers have claimed acquaintance with such objects. This paper attempts to analyze what is involved in such claims and to argue that they result from a number of confusions. The paper deals largely with the claim that substrata, or bare particulars, are presented since numerical difference is a simple fact that is presented. It further attempts to argue that while neither substrata nor universals, as such, are objects of acquaintance, there are some distinctions to be drawn between talk of universals as presented objects and talk of substrata being presented|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Davis (2004). The Brave New Bare Particularism. The Modern Schoolman 81 (4):267-273.
Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, Sacha Loeve, Alfred Nordmann & Astrid Schwarz (2011). Matters of Interest: The Objects of Research in Science and Technoscience. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):365-383.
Jiri Benovsky (2009). On (Not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: An Argument Against Endurantism. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):239 - 248.
Albert Casullo (1982). Particulars, Substrata, and the Identity of Indiscernibles. Philosophy of Science 49 (4):591-603.
Ingvar Johansson (2009). Proof of the Existence of Universals—and Roman Ingarden's Ontology. Metaphysica 10 (1):65-87.
Herbert Hochberg (1996). Particulars, Universals and Russell's Late Ontology. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:129-137.
Larry Lee Blackman (1983). Russell on the Relations of Universals and Particulars. Philosophy Research Archives 9:265-278.
E. D. Klemke (1960). Universals and Particulars in a Phenomenalist Ontology. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):254-261.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads6 ( #154,923 of 739,392 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?