David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Current developments in the sciences of the brain and mind sometimes seem to suggest that criminal conduct is a symptom of brain disorder or illness that should be treated rather than punished.Â This paper argues that the insights of these sciences should be taken very seriously by lawyers, but not to the detriment of common-sense ideas of responsibility or of their incorporation into the legal categories used in the criminal law.
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