The Conway-kochen 'free will theorem' and unscientific determinism
| Abstract | One has it that earlier circumstances and the laws of nature uniquely determine later circumstances, and the other has it that past present and future all exist tenselessly in a ‘block universe,’ so that the passage of time and associated changes in the world are illusions or at best merely apparent. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesMichael C. Laskowski (2003). An Application of Kochen's Theorem. Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (4):1181-1188.
Peter van Inwagen (1998). The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom. In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell.
C. Taylor & Daniel C. Dennett (2002). Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Itamar Pitowsky (2004). Generalizations of Kochen and Specker's Theorem and the Effectiveness of Gleason's Theorem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 35 (2):177-194.
Ehud Hrushovski & Itamar Pitowsky (2004). Generalizations of Kochen and Specker's Theorem and the Effectiveness of Gleason's Theorem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 35 (2):177-194.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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