David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):69-75 (1996)
David Chalmers distinguishes the hard problem of consciousness -- why should a physical system give rise to conscious experiences at all -- with what he calls the easy problems, the explanation of how cognitive systems, including human brains, perform various cognitive functions. He argues that the easy problems are easy because the performance of any function can be explained by specifying a mechanism that performs the function. This article argues that conscious experiences have a role in the performance by human beings of some cognitive functions, that can't be realised by mechanisms of the kind studied by the objective sciences; and that accordingly some of Chalmers’ easy problems will not be fully solved unless and until the hard problem is solved
|Keywords||Consciousness Experience Physical Science Chalmers, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Dan Zahavi (2003). Intentionality and Phenomenality: Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):63-92.
Jeff Foss (2009). The Scientific Explanation of Colour Qualia. Dialogue 48 (3):479.
Similar books and articles
Frederick B. Mills (1998). The Easy and Hard Problems of Consciousness: A Cartesian Perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):119-40.
Kieron O'Hara & Tom Scutt (1996). There is No Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):290-302.
E. J. Lowe (1995). There Are No Easy Problems of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):266-71.
Dan Zahavi (2003). Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):63-92.
Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6.
Eugene O. Mills (1996). Giving Up on the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.
Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (2007). Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
Brian D. Earp (2012). I Can't Get No (Epistemic) Satisfaction: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness Entails a Hard Problem of Explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 5 (1):14-20.
Liam P. Dempsey (2002). Chalmers' Fading and Dancing Qualla. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Commentary on Chalmers "Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness". Philosophical Explorations.
Massimo Pigliucci (2013). What Hard Problem? Philosophy Now (99).
David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Stevan Harnad (2001). No Easy Way Out. Philosophical Explorations.
David John Chalmers (2010). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #340,452 of 1,938,821 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #458,338 of 1,938,821 )
How can I increase my downloads?