Aquinas on the Moral Progress of the Weak Willed
In Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller & Matthias Perkams (eds.), The Problem of Weakness of Will in Medieval Philosophy. Peeters (2006)
| Abstract | The paper investigates Aquinas’s explanation of how the incontinent can make moral progress. The incontinent cannot be healed by moral instruction, because they already know what is best, but fail to act accordingly. Their moral knowledge has to be interiorized. Thus by attaining prudence and the moral virtues, moral knowledge becomes practically effective knowledge. Yet these virtues are no remedy for the incontinent, who are still struggling to attain them. By reason and will they can resist individual acts of incontinence, but in order to resist incontinence consistently, they need the assistance of grace. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesBonnie Kent (2007). Aquinas and Weakness of Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):70–91.
Jeffrey Hause (2007). Aquinas on the Function of Moral Virtue. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1-20.
Tobias Hoffmann (2003). Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus. The Thomist 67:73–94.
Ben Dixon (2005). Achieving Moral Progress Despite Moral Regress. Social Philosophy Today 21:157-172.
Jean Porter (1989). Moral Rules and Moral Actions: A Comparison of Aquinas and Modern Moral Theology. Journal of Religious Ethics 17 (1):123 - 149.
John Inglis (1999). Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: Rethinking the Standard Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas. Journal of Religious Ethics 27 (1):3 - 27.
Jean Porter (1995). Moral Action and Christian Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Xinyan Jiang (2000). What Kind of Knowledge Does a Weak-Willed Person Have?: A Comparative Study of Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School. Philosophy East and West 50 (2):242-253.
Catherine Wilson (2011). Moral Progress Without Moral Realism. Philosophical Papers 39 (1):97-116.
Philip Blosser (2005). The “Cape Horn” of Scheler's Ethics. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):121-143.
Michael Bratman (1979). Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will. Noûs 13 (2):153-171.
Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Joshua Schulz (2007). Grace and the New Man: Conscious Humiliation and the Revolution of Disposition in Kant's Religion. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):439-446.
M. V. Dougherty (2004). Moral Dilemmas and Moral Luck. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:233-246.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-01-28Total downloads6 ( #145,673 of 549,122 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,122 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
