Are propositions sets of possible worlds?
Analysis 72 (3):449-455 (2012)
| Abstract | The possible-worlds analysis of propositions identifies a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true. This analysis has the hitherto unnoticed consequence that a proposition depends for its existence on the existence of every proposition that entails it. This peculiar consequence places the possible-worlds analysis in conflict with the conjunction of two compelling theses. One thesis is that a phrase of the form ‘the proposition that S’ is a rigid designator. The other thesis is that a proposition which is directly about an object – a singular proposition – depends for its existence on the existence of the object. I defend these theses and conclude that the cost of the possible-worlds analysis is prohibitively high | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Dale Jacquette (2006). Propositions, Sets, and Worlds. Studia Logica 82 (3):337 - 343.
Phillip Bricker (1983). Worlds and Propositions: The Structure and Ontology of Logical Space. Dissertation, Princeton University
Jeffrey C. King (2007). What in the World Are the Ways Things Might Have Been? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):443 - 453.
Aviv Hoffmann (2003). A Puzzle About Truth and Singular Propositions. Mind 112 (448):635-651.
Cian Dorr (2005). Propositions and Counterpart Theory. Analysis 65 (287):210–218.
Edward N. Zalta (1987). On the Structural Similarities Between Worlds and Times. Philosophical Studies 51 (2):213-239.
Francesco Berto (2010). Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.
John Perry (1997). Reflexivity, Indexicality and Names. In W. Künne, A. Newen & M. Anduschus (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality and Propositional Attitudes. Csli.
Greg Restall (1997). Ways Things Can't Be. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (1996). The Doctrine of Descent in Jerónimo Pardo: Meaning, Inference, Truth. In I. Angelelli & M. Cerezo (eds.), Studies on the History of Logic. Walter de Gruyter.
Takashi Yagisawa (2010). Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise. Oxford University Press.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-06-19Total downloads65 ( #13,974 of 549,093 )Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,228 of 549,093 )How can I increase my downloads? |

