Henry of Ghent's Voluntarist Account of Weakness of Will

In Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present. Catholic University of America Press (2008)
According to Henry of Ghent, akrasia (incontinence or weakness of will) does not presuppose, but rather produces a cognitive defect. By tracing akratic actions and other evil actions to a corruption in the will rather than to a cognitive defect, Henry wants to safeguard their freedom. Though the will is able to reject what the intellect judges as best here and now, strength and freedom of the will increase to the degree that one adheres more firmly to the good. What strengthens the will are the moral virtues, which are essentially virtues of the will.
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Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
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