Hume on the Distinction of Reason

This paper concerns Hume?s treatment of the distinction of reason in the Treatise, I.i.7. Many scholars have claimed that there is a tension between his account of the distinction of reason and his commitment to his so-called separability principle. I explain why Hume?s account of the distinction of reason is fully consistent with the principle, and show how other discussions, both critical of and sympathetic to Hume, fail to appreciate the radicalness of his position. I evaluate Hume?s bold position and compare it to earlier positions (Aquinas) and current positions (Donald Davidson)
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DOI 10.1080/09608788.2011.624708
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