David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 7 (1):1-33 (2007)
One puzzling feature of talk about properties, propositions and natural numbers is that statements that are explicitly about them can be introduced apparently without change of truth conditions from statements that don't mention them at all. Thus it seems that the existence of numbers, properties and propositions can be established`from nothing'. This metaphysical puzzle is tied to a series of syntactic and semantic puzzles about the relationship between ordinary, metaphysically innocent statements and their metaphysically loaded counterparts, statements that explicitly mention numbers, properties and propositions, but nonetheless appear to be equivalent to the former. I argue that the standard solutions to the metaphysical puzzles make a mistaken assumption about the semantics of the loaded counterparts. Instead I propose a solution to the syntactic and semantic puzzles, and argue that this solution also gives us a new solution to the metaphysical puzzle. I argue that instead of containing more semantically singular terms that aim to refer to extra entities, the loaded counterparts are focus constructions. Their syntactic structure is in the service of presenting information with a focus, but not to refer to new entities. This will allow us to spell out Frege's metaphor of content carving.
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Peter Hanks (2009). Recent Work on Propositions. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
Berit Brogaard (2008). Inscrutability and Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):21 - 42.
Luca Moretti (2008). The Ontological Status of Minimal Entities. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):97 - 114.
Iris Einheuser (2009). Some Remarks on “Language-Created Entities”. Acta Analytica 24 (3):185-192.
Ross Inman (2012). Why so Serious? Non-Serious Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations. Metaphysica 13 (1):55-63.
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